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This paper investigates empirically whether there is a negative relationship between a country’s 
risk premium and the balance sheet effect, as implied by recent theories emphasizing financial 
imperfections. We find evidence that balance sheet effects, stemming from the increase in the 
external debt service after an unexpected real depreciation, significantly raise the risk premium.  
We also show that the increase in the risk premium is not due to the debt service as such. While 
the result holds for the whole sample, we show that it is mainly driven by those countries with the 
largest financial imperfections, as argued by imperfect capital market theories. Particularly large 
real depreciations also seem to be disproportionately important, meaning that the balance sheet 
effects may be strongest at times of economic crisis, when large devaluations occur.7
1. INTRODUCTION 
Conventional open economy models, and in particular the influential Mundell-Fleming model, 
imply that a real devaluation switches demand towards domestic production and is expansionary. 
But recent theories on credit constraints and balance sheet effects have challenged this view. The 
argument starts with the observation that if a country has a large debt with the rest of the world, 
and the value of the debt depends on the real exchange rate, a devaluation causes a fall in the 
country’s net worth. In the presence of financial imperfections, the balance sheet effect of a 
devaluation implies an increase in the cost of credit, a fall in aggregate demand, and hence a 
contraction in economic activity
5. This mechanism may be particularly strong in emerging 
countries since these countries generally borrow in foreign currency and are subject to sharp real 
exchange rate depreciations (or devaluations). 
Recent theoretical studies have developed the above argument in some detail; noteworthy 
contributions include Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001), and Céspedes, Chang and 
Velasco (2000). The empirical evidence is, however, scarce at this point, although sorely needed 
since the theory by itself cannot determine whether the balance sheet effect of a devaluation is 
strong enough to reverse conventional wisdom. 
This paper is an attempt to investigate the issue empirically. Our approach is to test whether 
balance sheet effects that emerge when the value of the external debt burden changes due to a 
real exchange depreciation significantly increase country risk in emerging countries. An 
affirmative answer is supported by our evidence. 
For a panel of emerging economies in the last decade, we construct a “balance sheet” variable by 
computing the change in the value of the debt service associated with unanticipated real 
depreciations. We find that this variable is significant in explaining the variation of the cost of 
credit in those economies. We argue that our findings are not due to the effect of the amount of 
debt owed, and that the impact of the balance sheet effects of a real depreciation are stronger 
during economic crises and in countries with higher degrees of financial imperfections. These 
results should obviously be corroborated by further work, but seem highly stimulating and 
relevant to current debates. 
5 Country risk excludes the changes that might occur in US interest rates, which are obviously exogenous. 
The external cost of credit includes both. 8
The only paper that attempts an empirical exercise similar to ours is Bleakley and Cowan (2002) 
but it differs from ours in substantial ways. Bleakley and Cowan investigated a panel of firms 
from Latin America countries, and hence focused on micro data, as opposed to our work which is 
based on macro data. Bleakley and Cowan focused on investment, not the cost of credit. And, 
finally, their results are quite different: they found that firms with a larger amount of debt in 
dollar tend to invest more after a real depreciation, which runs contrary to the implications of the 
recent literature on credit constraints although the authors do not control for the degree of 
constraints for each firm. Our results, in turn, are much more supportive of that literature. 
Section 2 offers a simple theoretical framework for our empirical test. Section 3 describes the 
data used and the empirical challenges. Section 4 offers the findings. Finally, Section 5 draws 
some preliminary conclusions and points to venues of future research. 
2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section illustrates with a very simple theoretical framework the implications of recent 
theories on the interaction between balance sheet effects, dollarized liabilities, and exchange rates 
that justify our empirical focus. Consider a small open economy, indexed by i, whose residents 
borrow in the international capital markets. One may assume that the borrowing amount is ﬁxed
in terms of an international currency (henceforth called dollar). We denote by  it K  the spread 
between the interest rate charged to that borrower and the world interest rate, or risk premium for 
short. The key question we address is whether there is an inverse relation between the risk 
premium and the value of the borrower´s own funds available for investment: 
) ( 1 it it Z K <            ( 1 )  
where  <  is a strictly decreasing function and  it Z  denotes real net worth, that is, net worth 
measured in terms of the country´s ﬁnal (consumption or investment) goods. Final goods are 
assumed to be a composite of tradables and nontradables. 
Equation (1) is the hallmark of recent theories of balance sheet effects and financial 
imperfections and can be justiﬁed in at least two different but related ways. The first one, 
associated with the work of Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2000), and Gertler, Gilchrist and 
Natalucci (2001), and others, stresses the effects of a devaluation on the financial agency costs 9
due to asymmetric information or imperfect enforcement: the smaller a borrower´s net worth, the 
more he or she needs to rely on external ﬁnance, which increases agency costs. Since the 
international capital market is assumed to be competitive and foreign lenders base their decisions 
on their opportunity cost of funds, higher expected agency costs raise the risk premium. A 
slightly different view, associated with Hart and Moore (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
is that the costs of borrowing decrease in the value of the collateral that the borrower can post 
against the loan. If collateral is given by the real value of the borrower´s net assets, (1) follows. 
Recent international macro models take the above formulation as a starting point, and add the 
observation that international debt obligations are very often “dollarized”, that is, denominated in 
foreign currency. Under such circumstances, which are typical of emerging economies, a real 
exchange depreciation can easily reduce the dollar value of domestic net worth so that, under (1), 
the cost of credit must increase relative to the world interest rate (i.e., the country risk must rise). 
To see how that implication is derived, let us assume that the net worth can be expressed as 
it it it it X D Z
    Z       ( 2 )  
where 

it D is the country´s debt, in dollars, due in period t , it X  is the real exchange rate (the 
price of dollars in terms of the country´s ﬁnal good), and  it Z  denotes other determinants of net 
worth in period t . Let  i K  and  i Z  denote the mean values of  it K  and Ȧit . Then, taking a linear 
approximation to (1) around  i Z ,
) ( ) ( 1 i it i it Z Z Z K  <c  < |       
it EZ D  {
it it it X D Z
     E E D     ( 3 )  
where 
' <    E  denotes the negative of the first derivative of <  evaluated at  i Z , D is a 
constant, and the last equality follows from (2). 
The value of E  is of particular interest, as it is crucial for the recent debate on the implications 
of a real exchange depreciation. If country i has a substantial debt burden in dollar, a real 
depreciation (an increase in it X ) will make i's net worth fall, ceteris paribus. Then, if E  is 10
signiﬁcantly positive, the risk premium  it K  must increase. This reasoning, however, is based on 
the crucial assumption of a positiveE  . In reality, these theories do not necessarily predict 
that E  should be different from zero: in the absence of ﬁnancial imperfections, there should be 
no connection between the cost of credit and i’s  net worth, andE  should be zero. In turn, 
E   should be larger than zero if there are financial imperfections. Our empirical work will, 
therefore, focus on testing whether E  is significantly positive and in which circumstances, in 
terms of financial imperfections. This requires further elaboration of the basic relationship (3). 
The immediate empirical problem is that the net worth is not directly observable: while it 
depends on the external debt burden, it may also depend on other variables, such as the amount of 
current resources available to reduce the need for external ﬁnance. In practice, these other 
variables (which we have collapsed into the variable it Z ) are very difficult to observe. So we 
proceed in a slightly different direction. 
A convenient assumption to reach a testable equation is that 

it D  is predetermined as of period t.
Then, taking the expectation of (3) conditional on information available at  1  t , and subtracting 
the result from (3), we get: 
it it t it it it t it X E X D E H E K K      

 ) ( 1 1     (4) 
where  ) ( 1   t E  denotes the conditional expectation operator, and  ) ( 1 lt t lt it Z E Z     E H   is the 
unexpected component of E it Z .
Equation (4) simply decomposes the unexpected change in i's country risk into two components. The 
ﬁrst is the impact of an unanticipated increase in the external debt burden, given by a linear 
function of the debt burden times the unexpected real depreciation. The second component is the 
effect of unanticipated changes in other components of net worth. If we treated the latter as an 
unobservable shock, we could estimate equation (4) provided that   it H  is uncorrelated 
with ) ( 1 it t it it X E X D 
  . Since 

it D  is assumed to be predetermined, the latter condition would 
imply that  it H  be uncorrelated with  it t it X E X 1   . As a first step, we assume this to be the case, 11
but we will test for omitted variables in the empirical part. There, we shall also relax the 
assumption that the debt burden is predetermined. 
To implement equation (4) econometrically, we resort to two further approximations. First, we 
replace the expectation of the country risk in t-1,  it K 1 - t E , with a linear function of predetermined 
variables,  1 ,  c t i iY J  (where  1 ,  t i Y  and  i J  are conformable vectors). Second, we replace the term 
it t X E 1   with  1 ,  t i X ; this is likely to entail little loss, since real exchange rates are usually very 
close to random walks, at least in the case of pure floats or fixed exchange regimes
6. In the case 
of intermediate regimes, the lack of hedging opportunities in many emerging countries could 
make this assumption less restrictive than thought at first sight. 
The resulting equation to estimate is: 
it t i it it Y S H J E K  c    1 ,     ( 5 )  
where  ) ( 1
*
    it it it it X X D S  is interpreted as the change in the value of country’s i’s external 
debt burden due to an unanticipated real exchange depreciation in period t. As already mentioned, 
our key concern is whether the impact of the balance sheet effects on the cost of credit, the 
coefficient E , is signiﬁcantly positive and whether this depends on the degree of financial 
imperfections. 
3. THE DATA 
The empirical implementation of equation (5) involves several data difficulties, the main one 
being related to measuring the risk premium variable (Șit). That variable represents, in theory, the 
cost of credit on the marginal funding for country i during year t. In practice, unfortunately, 
available measures of the cost of credit seem very far from that ideal. The best available proxy, 
and the most widely used in the literature, are the returns implicit in the Emerging Markets Bonds 
Indices (EMBI), provided by JP Morgan. For each country and year in that dataset we construct a 
credit spread measure (COSTBORROWING) by subtracting total returns on US Treasury bonds 
from that country’s EMBI returns. We limited our sample to countries with at least four 
observations of EMBI returns, which reduces the sample to twenty-seven countries. Ten of them 
6 The exception would be crawling pegs. 12
have data from 1993, when the EMBI started being produced and all countries have data for the 
last year, 2002. Given this data constraints, the total sample is composed of 203 yearly 
observations. Table 1 in Appendix 1 lists the countries and the data availability while Appendix 2 
offers a detailed description of the variable definitions and sources. 
To proxy for the balance sheet term  it S  in equation (5), we construct a variable called 
BALANCESHEET, which is an interaction term, namely the product of EXSURPRISE and 
DEBT*. EXSURPRISE equals the change in i’s real exchange rate (EX as defined in 
Appendix 2) between year t and year t-1, and DEBT* is the US dollar value of i’s debt service 
due in year t divided by i’s GDP in 1995 prices. The latter is done to avoid country’s size 
determining the results. 
Finally, (5) includes the vector  1  it Y  of predetermined variables that help predict the risk 
premium in t. In principle, any variable available in period t-1 may be included in that vector, as 
long as it helps predicting  it K . We limited attention, however, to the level of the risk premium 
in t-1 (COSTBORROWING_1), given its high persistence and the real GDP in t-1 (RGDP_1). 
We also include other control variables, which are: the global JP Morgan index for emerging 
countries (EMBIWORLD), as a proxy for the cost of borrowing for all emerging countries as 
asset class; and the level of international reserves in real terms (RRES). At a later stage, we shall 
also include the increase in the dollar value of exports (¨EXPORT) to control for changes in 
other aspects of net wealth related to the real exchange depreciation. This will reduce the 
probability of a bias when estimating ȕ  because of omitted variables. 
As a first step, in estimating ȕ via OLS, we assume that the error term  it H  is uncorrelated with 
it S  or, in other words, that unexpected changes in net worth, other than the balance sheet effect 
of a real depreciation, are uncorrelated with the latter. Given the potential restrictiveness of this 
hypothesis, we test that the coefficient ȕ does not change when potentially relevant variables 
(such as ¨EXPORT) is included in the regression. The fact that ȕ does not change can be taken as 
tentative confirmation that the potential omitted variables problem is not biasing the coefficient 
of our objective variable (BALANCESHEET). In any event, we do include ¨EXPORT as 
additional regressors since they are found significant and add useful information. 13
Table 2 in Appendix 1 presents some descriptive statistics, and Table 3 the matrix of correlations 
between the different variables. Observe the relatively high correlation (0.43) between 
COSTBORROWING and BALANCESHEET; interestingly, COSTBORROWING has a lower 
correlation with the total amount borrowed, proxied by the debt service in current prices 
(DEBT*). Although no firm conclusions can be drawn from simple bi-variate correlations, it 
suggests, as emphasized in the theory, that it is not the amount borrowed that influences the 
external cost of borrowing but rather unexpected changes in net wealth.  On the other hand, the 
correlation between COSTBORROWING and the change in real exchange rate, EXSURPRISE, 
is the highest of the three. Finally, the correlation of the dependent variable in t and in t-1 is very 
high (0.71), showing that stationarity may be an issue. Also in line with the literature, the two 
control variables related to positive wealth effects (¨EXPORT and RRES) are negatively 
correlated with the dependent variable (-0.12 and -0.06, respectively). 
Graphs  1-3 in Appendix  1 depict the evolution of COSTBORROWING against 
BALANCESHEET, EXSURPRISE, and DEBT from 1993 to 2002. COSTBORROWING and 
BALANCESHEET show a  positive co-movement in a number of years, stronger in the period 
1994-95 and weaker in 1997-98 and 2001-02. There is a positive co-movement between 
COSTBORROWING and EXSURPRISE and DEBT*, respectively, although in both cases there 
are clear exceptions in 1995-96, 1999 and 2000. 
4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
4. 1. Basic Findings 
The results are obtained by estimating equation (5) with pooled data. In the first regression, 
which is given by the middle column of Table 1, the coefficient of BALANCESHEET is positive 
and significant at the one percent level. Its magnitude is also reasonable in economic terms: it 
implies that if there is an unexpected devaluation that makes a country’s debt service increase by 
one percent of its 1995 GDP, the cost of credit will increase by about 61 basis points, ceteris 
paribus. The coefficients of the control variables have the expected sign. The level of reserves 
reduces the cost of borrowing and is significant at the 5% level. The coefficients of 
EMBIWORLD and COSTBORROWING_1 are positive. 14
In a second regression, given by the rightmost column in Table 1, we included the year to year 
change in exports (¨EXPORT) as an explanatory variable. As stressed earlier, our aim is to test 
whether the significance of BALANCESHEET in the regression hinges on an omitted variable 
problem, stemming from the effect of an unexpected variation in the real exchange rate on 
components of net wealth other than the value of the debt service. The most obvious such 
component is the increase in exports due to the impact of a real devaluation on competitiveness. 
While the inclusion of ¨EXPORT results in a lower estimate for the BALANCESHEET 
coefficient, the fall is relatively small: in fact a Wald test, shown at the bottom of  Table 1, cannot 
reject the hypothesis of equal BALANCESHEET coefficients in the two regressions in the table 
at conventional significance levels. This favors the view that the significance of 
BALANCESHEET is not due to omitted variables bias. On the other hand, ¨EXPORT turns out 
to be significant in explaining the country risk premium, with the expected negative sign, so we 
keep it in the remaining regressions. 
Number of obs 177 177
R-squared 0.5733 0.5909
COSTBORROWING_1 0.7480 *** 0.7713 ***
(0.0618) (0.0613)




BALANCESHEET 6093.6530 *** 4945.7070 ***
(1375.477) (1415.688)
RRES -48.4515 ** -47.1219 **
(23.3747) (22.9589)






Standard errors in parenthesis
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The Wald test assesses the equality of the coefficient of the variable 
balancesheet in both regressions. It is destributed as a         





The next question we address is whether the significance of the BALANCESHEET variable is 
really due to the impact of debt accumulation on the cost of credit and not to the presence of 
balance sheet effects. In a way, we are testing whether the assumption of debt being 
predetermined is key for the results. To this end, in Table 2 we ask what, if any, is the impact of 
including measures of the accumulation of debt as explanatory variables in our regression. 
Column I reproduces our basic regression for convenience. In column II, the change in debt 
service in US dollar (¨DEBT*) is included as an additional regressor. We find that ¨DEBT* is 
not significant and that the coefficient of BALANCESHEET is not significantly affected. The 
same happens when we include the real value of the debt service (DEBT*), as indicated in 
column III. Hence the evidence is supportive of the view that, an increase in the amount 
borrowed is not as relevant for the risk premium as unexpected changes in the debt service due to 
the variation in the real exchange rate (the balance sheet effect). 
Number of obs 177 177 177
R-squared 0.5909 0.5955 0.5909
(I) (II) (III)
COSTBORROWING_1 0.7713 *** 0.7712 *** 0.7713 ***
(0.0613) (0.0598) (0.0601)
EMBIWORLD 0.5259 ** 0.5263 0.5259 **
(0.2129) (0.2075) (0.2087)






BALANCESHEET 4945.7070 *** 4947.757 *** 4945.708 ***
(1415.688) (1379.687) (1387.399)
RRES -47.1219   **                 -47.11273     **              -47.1219  **
(22.9589) (22.3739) (22.5001)
¨EXPORT  -566.2357  ***  -565.8555  **  -566.2357  ***
(209.1413) (203.8285) (204.9618)
CONS -387.5060 -387.2029 -387.506
(324.4174) (316.1583) (317.9343)
Wald test 0.00 0.00
(p-value) 0.9889 0.9654
Standard errors in parenthesis
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The Wald test assesses the equality of the coefficient of the variable 
balancesheet in regressions II vs I and III vs I. It is destributed as a         





4.2. Robustness Issues 
An obvious objection to these results is that there may be a simultaneity bias. Our regression 
equation (5) may be only one of the equations determining equilibrium; other equations may 
imply that variations in the cost of borrowing affect exchange rates contemporaneously. In such a 
case, our estimate of the coefficient of BALANCESHEET can only be interpreted as a reduced 
form one, and not as giving the impact of balance sheet effects on the cost of credit. 
To determine whether a simultaneity bias is a significant concern, we perform a Hausman test, 
which requires finding an adequate instrument for BALANCESHEET. But this implies finding 
an instrument for EXSURPRISE only, as the debt service is assumed to be predetermined. Of the 
available alternatives, the inflation rate (INFLATION) seems to be best suited to act as an 
instrument for EXSURPRISE. In theory, INFLATION and EXSURPRISE should be highly 
correlated if exchange rate pass through coefficients are constant. On the other hand, it is 
plausible to believe that the cost of credit does not react strongly to inflation rates. This is 
corroborated by Graphs 4 and 5, which show that there is a significant correlation between 
EXSURPRISE and INFLATION but a much weaker one between INFLATION and 
COSTBORROWING. 
Using INFLATION as an instrument for EXSURPRISE, we run a regression with this 
instrumental variable, and conduct a Hausman test on the differences between the coefficients of 
the balance sheet variable. The basic and parallel regressions are both given in Table 3, as well as 
the value of the Hausman test, which does not reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients at 
conventional levels. Hence, one cannot reject the hypothesis of no simultaneity bias. However, 
this result must be taken with some caution, since the coefficient of BALANCESHEET in the 
instrumental variable regression is estimated very imprecisely. It is, therefore, not clear whether 
the low value of the Hausman test reflects the absence of a simultaneity bias or just the large 
variance of the estimate of the BALANCESHEET coefficient. 17
Number of obs 177 177
R-squared 0.5909 0.5714
OLS IV
COSTBORROWING_1 0.7713 *** 0.8257 ***
(0.0613) (0.0674)




BALANCESHEET 4945.7070 *** 919.8002
(1415.688) (2322.362)
RRES -47.1219 ** -53.8454 **
(22.9589) (23.6933)






IV regression: DEBT*×INFLATION used as an instrument
for the variable BALANCESHEET.
Standard errors in parenthesis
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Instrument for the variable "balancesheet" is Debt * Inflation
Table 3. Testing for the simultaneity bias
Dependent variable: COSTBORROWING
Note: The Hausman test assesses the equality of the coefficient of the variable 
balancesheet in both regressions. It is destributed as a          ȋ
2
Another possible objection to our basic regressions is that the dependent variable, 
COSTBORROWING, may not be stationary. From Table 3 in Appendix 1, we know that 
COSTBORROWING is very persistent. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that credit spreads 
are integrated of order greater than zero. In any case, we run the baseline regression with 
COSTBORROWING in differences. As Table 4 shows, the results are not significantly affected, 
and BALANCESHEET remains significant at a 5% level. 18
.
Number of obs 177 177
R-squared 0.5733 0.1631
Dependent variable COSTBORROWING ¨COSTBORROWING
COSTBORROWING_1 0.7713 ***
(0.0613)




BALANCESHEET 4945.7070 *** 3299.6270 **
(1415.688) (1394.921)
RRES -47.1219 ** -60.0196 **
(22.9589) (23.5376)
¨EXPORT -566.2357 *** -676.0843 ***
(209.1413) (214.7257)




Standard errors in parenthesis
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The Wald test assesses the equality of the coefficient of the variable balancesheet in 
both regressions. It is destributed as a         
Table 4. Controlling for the order of integration of the dependent variable  
ȋ
2
Unfortunately, the number of observations per country is too low to apply the asymptotic 
properties needed for a panel regression, with random or fixed effects. However, a panel 
regression with fixed effects is conducted with our unbalanced panel data to test for the role of 
unobserved heterogeneity. As shown in Table 5, the coefficient of the control variable 
COSTBORROWING_1 shows that the countries’ idiosyncratic factors are very important to 
explain the persistence of the coefficient in the pooled regressions. For the rest of the 
coefficients, the results are very similar except for the variable ¨EXPORT which is not 
significant. 
OLS  regression.19
Number of obs 177 177
R-squared 0.5733 0.3517
Pooled data Fixed effects
COSTBORROWING_1 0.7713 *** 0.3296 ***
(0.0613) (0.0918)
EMBIWORLD 0.5259 ** 0.5146 ***
(0.2129) (0.1942)
RGDP_1 219.9883 652.9439 **
(248.9829) (305.5127)
BALANCESHEET 4945.7070 *** 9147.4290 ***
(1415.688) (1714.155)
RRES -47.1219 ** -176.9099 ***
(22.9589) (52.7997)





Standard errors in parenthesis
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5. Testing for the role of unobserved heterogeneity.
Dependent variable: COSTBORROWING
4.3. On the Impact of Crises and Financial Development 
As shown in Table 2, BALANCESHEET has a large variance. It may therefore be of interest to 
check whether its significance in explaining the credit spread is due to the impact of outliers. This 
may also be noteworthy, given the prominence of crises episodes in the recent debate and in the 
generation of the theory. 
In Table 6 we exclude observations associated with 5% of the extreme values of EXSURPRISE 
(column II), DEBT* (column III) and BALANCESHEET (column IV). The coefficient of 
BALANCESHEET drops to the 10% level when the extreme values of BALANCESHEET or
EXSURPRISE are excluded but remains significant at the 1% level when those of DEBT* are 
excluded. These results show that large real exchange rate surprises (treated here as outliers) are 
particularly detrimental in terms of an increase in the external cost of borrowing. This suggests 
that the balance sheet effects may be greatest at times of crisis, when large devaluations occur. 
Large amounts of debt do not appear to be as nearly as important. 20
Number of obs 1 7 71 6 81 6 81 6 8
R-squared 0.5909 0.5956 0.5907 0.5651
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
COSTBORROWING_1 0.7713 *** 0.7454 *** 0.7636 *** 0.7227 ***
(0.0613) (0.0540) (0.0635) (0.0583)
EMBIWORLD 0.5259 ** 0.5352 *** 0.5644 ** 0.5185 ***
(0.2129) (0.1915) (0.2229) (0.1863)
RGDP_1 219.9883 41.4915 272.3117 54.5201
(248.9829) (225.6729) (262.8171) (228.8350)
BALANCESHEET 4945.7070 *** 2338.6970 * 6055.9660 *** 3059.9090 *
(1415.688) (1365.009) (1645.485) (1702.886)
RRES -47.1219 ** 38.3002 * -46.2490 *** -35.7364 *
(22.9589) (20.3438) (23.3018) (20.5379)
¨EXPORT -566.2357 *** -619.7141 *** -522.5837 ** -602.7257 ***
(209.1413) (184.6994) (215.8192) (185.9734)
CONS -387.5060 -167.4934 -478.0692 -173.2618
(324.4174) (291.0600) (341.5268) (295.3951)
Standard errors in parenthesis
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Regression I: OLS with all the data. Regression II: OLS excluding 5% 
extreme values of  EXSURPRISE variable. Regression III: OLS excluding 5% 
extreme values of  DEBT* variable. Regression IV: OLS excluding 5% 
extreme values of  BALANCESHEET variable.    
Table 6. OLS without extreme values
Dependent variable: COSTBORROWING
Finally, it is important to recall that the theory assigns primary importance to the degree of 
financial imperfections in explaining why a reduction in net worth increases the country risk 
premium. So far we have implicitly assumed that countries are similar in the degree of their 
financial imperfections, but it is interesting to explore the consequences of dropping that 
assumption. 
As a first exercise, a measure of creditor rights, compiled by the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), is used as a proxy for the degree of financial imperfections. This variable has 
yearly variation. CREDITORIGHTS_TOTAL is the original ICRG classification, which can vary 
from 0 to 12, while CREDITORIGHTS is a simplified version composed of 3 possible levels to 
classify countries. As Table 7 shows, both variables negatively, and significantly, affect the 
sovereign risk premium, other things given. 21
Number of obs 177 177 177
R-squared 0.5909 0.5955 0.5948
COSTBORROWING_ 0.7713 *** 0.7235 *** 0.7448 ***
(0.0613) (0.0611) (0.0612)
EMBIWORLD 0.5259 ** 0.3915 * 0.3955 *
(0.2129) (0.2125) (0.2177)
RGDP_1 219.9883 438.3407 * 384.3926
(248.9829) (249.7730) (252.9829)
BALANCESHEET 4945.7070 *** 4458.5970 *** 4322.8080 ***
(1415.688) (1382.293) (1414.765)
RRES -47.1219 ** -43.1622 * -46.6392 **
(22.9589) (22.3129) (22.6138)






CONS -387.5060 -170.1404 -267.8797
(324.4174) (323.5910) (325.3788)
Standard errors in parenthesis
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7. Controlling for financial imperfections
Dependent variable: COSTBORROWING
In a second exercise, we divide the sample into three groups, from worst to better financial 
imperfections (proxied by the CREDITORIGHTS), and estimate our basic regression for each 
group. As shown in Table 8, only in the group with the worst creditor rights do balance sheet 
effects significantly increase the risk premium, other things given. This result expected from our 
theoretical framework, where changes in net worth affect the risk premium only in the presence 
of financial imperfections. 22
Number of obs 177 56 58 62
R-squared 0.5909 0.6163 0.6291 0.6989
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
COSTBORROWING_1 0.7713 *** 1.0141 *** 0.5579 *** 0.6256 ***
(0.0613) (0.1442) (0.0645) (0.0762)
EMBIWORLD 0.5259 ** 0.4603 0.3264 0.5886 **
(0.2129) (0.5154) (0.2547) (0.2377)
RGDP_1 219.9883 283.1467 490.0614 -239.6217
(248.9829) (947.0221) (306.6608) (167.3363)
BALANCESHEET 4945.7070 *** 7837.3830 ** 1005.2180 341.4880
(1415.688) (3251.488) (1743.933) (1143.936)
RRES -47.1219 ** -33.2864 -39.0033 -32.4217 *
(22.9589) (58.6459) (27.2231) (17.1944)
¨EXPORT -566.2357 *** 469.3215 -759.0974 *** -234.5716
(209.1413) (472.8350) (273.3566) (197.8651)
Cons -387.5060 -553.2324 -464.2393 118.5409
(324.4174) (1106.189) (386.3817) (203.6649)
OLS estimation
Standard errors in parenthesis
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8. Controlling for financial imperfections per country group 
Dependent variable: COSTBORROWING
Note: We have divided the sample into three subsamples according to 
the quality of CREDITORIGHTS. Regression I: all countries included. 
Regression II: only countries with worst CREDITORIGHTS  Regression 
III: only countries with average CREDITORIGHTS. Regression IV: only 
countries with best CREDITORIGHTS.
5. FINAL REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper tests empirically whether, as implied by recent theories of imperfect capital markets, 
there is a negative relationship between a country’s risk premium and balance sheet effects, in the 
presence of financial imperfections. We find evidence that balance sheet effects (i.e., the increase 
in the debt service because of an unexpected real depreciation) significantly raise the risk 
premium, other things given. On the whole, the evidence is supportive. However, further research 
should be directed at confirming or refuting our results. 
If one accepts our evidence that balance sheet effects are significant for the cost of credit, the 
policy implications are severe. There is an argument to avoid sharp changes in the real exchange 
rate unless financial imperfections are small, in the line suggested by Hausmann, Panizza and 
Stein (2000) in the literature of original sin. 23
Given the frequency of large real exchange rate depreciations in emerging countries, this issue is 
clearly worth a deeper look. There are several venues for further research. First, an analysis of the 
net effect of a real depreciation seems warranted, which includes both balance sheet effects and 
competitiveness into one single coefficient. In our study both coefficients are significant (except 
when fixed effects are included which takes away the significance of the competitiveness factor) 
and with the expected opposite sign but we cannot say which one is larger. Second, the impact of 
domestic dollarization and its interrelation with external dollarization needs further theoretical 
analysis. Third, it would be interesting to test whether a particular exchange rate regime reduces 
the impact of balance sheet effects on country risk, as argued by Céspedes,  Chang and 
Velasco (2000). Finally, the definition of financial imperfections, key in these types of models, 
would also need to be expanded from creditor rights to broader measures.24
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Appendix 1  
Stylized facts and robustness tests 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































Republic of Lebanon 1998-2002 5
Russian Federation 1997-2002 6
Slovakia 1993-2002 10
South Africa 1994-2002 9





No. of observations 203
Table 1. Countries and years included
Variable No. Obs. Mean Std. Deviation Minimun Maximun
COSTBORROWING 203 548.7588 516.3456 60.233 3925.75
EMBIWORLD 203 615.4016 138.0896 352.7197 1007.554
RGDP 203 1.086323 0.1193713 0.8032234 1.595363
DEBT* 203 0.0838068 0.0397401 0.0157412 0.2695656
¨DEBT* 203 0.0531654 0.2448129 -0.8825761 1.247985
EXSURPRISE 203 0.1615187 0.2293617 -0.1386505 1.400133
BALANCESHEET 203 0.0132571 0.0198881 -0.0122493 0.1159719
¨EXSURPRISE 203 0.1963108 0.3884993 -0.0945891 2.943017
DEBT95 203 0.0890805 0.0430229 0.0175663 0.2826906
INFLATION 203 0.168791 0.37033 -0.0432768 3.152852
RRES  203  1.475911   1.149342   0.1228686  9.046
¨EXPORT 203 0.0597161 0.1334132 -0.4543486 0.5876541
CREDITORIGHTS 203 7273632 2123617 2 12















EMBIWORLD 0.1580 0.0456 1.0000
0.0244 0.5469
R GDP  -0. 2331  - 0. 2384  -0. 0512 1. 0000
0.1033 0.0030 0.6009
DEBT* 0.2023 0.1849 0.0002 0.1578 1.0000
0.0038 0.0137 0.9975 0.0245
¨DEBT* -0.1661 -0.1345 0.0078 -0.0682 0.1544 1.0000
0.0178 0.0742 0.9119 0.3334 0.0278
EXSURPRISE 0.4838 0.3513 -0.0205 -0.3857 -0.0308 -0.0082 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.7716 0.0000 0.6627 0.9070
BALANCESHEET 0.4290 0.3036 -0.0072 -0.2780 0.2948 0.0204 0.8278 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.9183 0.0001 0.0000 0.7724 0.0000
¨SURPRISE 0.2644 0.2353 0.0346 -0.3331 -0.0615 0.0765 0.8582 0.6227 1.0000
0.0001 0.0016 0.6243 0.0000 0.3835 0.2781 0.0000 0.0000
DEBT95 0.3245 0.2351 0.0162 0.1266 0.8762 0.1258 0.1488 0.4554 0.0024 1.0000
0.0000 0.0016 0.8181 0.0719 0.0000 0.0738 0.0341 0.0000 0.9732
INFLATION 0.2060 0.2844 -0.0404 -0.3354 -0.0519 0.0121 0.6802 0.4249 0.7278 -0.0147 1.0000
0.0032 0.0001 0.5669 0.0000 0.4623 0.8641 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8348
RRES -0.0633 0.0608 -0.0391 0.3386 0.1969 -0.0759 -0.1827 -0.1100 -0.1116 0.0087 -0.1229 1.0000
0.3695 0.4212 0.5799 0.0000 0.0049 0.2818 0.0091 0.1182 0.1128 0.9015 0.0807
¨EXPORT -0.1242 0.0929 0.1387 -0.0797 -0.1114 0.0930 -0.1986 -0.2381 -0.1266 -0.1810 0.0601 0.1017 1.0000
0.0774 0.2189 0.0485 0.2584 0.1136 0.1867 0.0045 0.0006 0.0719 0.0097 0.3944 0.1487
CREDITORIGTHS -0.3829 -0.3040 -0.1474 0.4764 0.0827 -0.0116 0.2864 -0.2236 -0.1926 0.0533 -0.1874 1.607 -0.0611 1.000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0368 0.0000 0.2431 0.8706 0.0000 0.0014 0.0061 0.4521 0.0077 0.0227 0.3892




Data sources and definitions of variables 
Below we list the variables and sources used for this study, as well as the transformations we 
have made to the data . The data are annual and cover the periods and countries shown in 
Table 1. 
Dependent variable:
* Country risk premium or spread in the external cost of borrowing (COSTBORROWING):
equals returns for U.S. dollar-denominated Brady bonds, loans, Eurobonds, and U.S. dollar-
denominated local markets instruments for emerging markets minus total returns for U.S. 
Treasury bonds with similar maturity (the stripped yields of the Emerging Markets Bond Index, 
EMBI, for each country).  
Source: JP Morgan. 
Objective variables:
* Total debt service index (DEBT*): equals the sum of gross interest payments due on external 
debt and amortization paid on medium/long-term external debt in U.S. dollars divided by the 
nominal GDP in 1995 U.S. dollars to take into account the relative size of the country. 
Source: The Institute of International Finance. 
* Real exchange rate in 1995 local currency index (EX): equals the average number of units of 
local currency per U.S. dollar during the year in real terms (that is, divided by GDP deflator of 
the country with 1995=1) divided by the nominal exchange rate in 1995 (in order to make more 
similar very different figures). Thus, in 1995, EX is equal to 1 and an increase (decrease) in EX is 
a depreciation (appreciation). 
Source: The Institute of International Finance 
* EXSURPRISE: equals the changes in EX between the year t and year t-1. 
* BALANCESHEET: equals the product of DEBT* and EXSURPRISE. 
* Real GDP in 1995 local currency (RGDP): This variable is divided by the real GDP in 1995 in 
local currency of the year 1995. The objective of this transformation is to take into account the 
relative size of the country. Hence, this variable takes the value 1 for all countries in year 1995.  
Source: The Institute of International Finance.31
Control variables and instruments:
* Average emerging country risk premium or spread in the external cost of borrowing for the 
emerging market asset class (EMBIWORLD): equals the stripped yields of the Emerging 
Markets Bond Index, EMBI. 
Source: JP Morgan. 
* Exports (EXPORT): equals the total value of transactions arising from the export of goods and 
services to nonresidents, valued at market prices in millions of U.S. dollars. 
Source: The Institute of International Finance. 
* Reserves excluding gold in 1995 U.S. dollars (RRES): equals official international reserves at 
the end of the reporting year in millions of U.S. dollars, excluding gold, but including foreign 
exchange, SDRs, and the reserve position in the IMF divided by the nominal GDP in 1995 U.S. 
dollars (again, to take into account the relative size of the country). 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
* Factors affecting the risk to investment (CREDITORIGHTS): measure the quality of the 
institutional setting affecting the risk of investment. The rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents, each with a maximum score of 4 and a minimum score of 0. A score of 4 
indicates a very good environment for creditors and 0 a very poor. The subcomponents are: 
contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation and payment delays. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide. 
* Inflation (INFLATION): equals the yearly percentage change in the GDP deflator. 
Source: The Institute of International Finance. 